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Abstract
The computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word than the announcement of a
glamorous marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern West, the
Enlightenment, the impulse to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the
Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an ancient impulse to reduce the demands of nature to insignificance. By
now we know that some of the fondest legacies of the Enlightenment, such as the belief that the world is
fully knowable and that nothing more than rational knowledge is necessary to make us free, are
ambiguous ones, but it is still difficult for us to admit that the vision of the Industrial Revolution was naive.
In many ways we still believe that utopia is available to everyone who has the right equipment.
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computer revolution is less a revolution in the usual sense of the word
than the announcement of a glamorous
marriage between two powerful promises in the history of the modern
West, the Enlightenment, the impulse
to encompass the entire world in a rational system of knowledge, and the
Industrial Revolution, the fruit of an
ancient impulse to reduce the demands
of nature to insignificance. By now we
know that some of the fondest legacies
of the Enlightenment, such as the
belief that the world is fully knowable
and that nothing more than rational
knowledge is necessary to make us
free, are ambiguous ones, but it is still
difficult for us to admit that the vision
of the Industrial Revolution was naive.
In many ways we still believe that
utopia is available to everyone who has
the right equipment.
Older by far than these two projects
to shape human existence is the quest
of the humanities to understand the
meaning of human dignity and identity. Their most distinguished efforts
have come from the desire to open human imagination to its highest possibilities and greatest freedoms. The humanist examination of values at the
core of human experience offers some
of the most searching standards by
which to measure the Midas-like claims
of the information revolution.
The marvelous capacities of new information technologies are not in
doubt. But virtuosity is not virtue. All
technologies that promise to make recalcitrant social problems yield to apparatus are suspect. So advertised, they
have the greatest power to enter and
alter our lives in unanticipated ways.
Without any doubt, new information
technologies pose life-transforming
questions of access and control, price
and distribution, the changing organization of labor at home and abroad, altered structures of banking and finance, what information will be hardest to come by, what information will
be most highly valued - and most important of all, who is to be put at risk
by the changes taking place, and how.
But there are things we are entitled
i8/September i982/Illinois Issues

to expect from an information revolution worthy of its name. A revolution
that deserves our sympathy usually involves a shift of power from those who
have more than is just to those with less
than is necessary, accompanied by an
increase in the general happiness. But
the happy people in the imagery of this
revolution are already comfortable and
affluent. They are frequently bosses,
but there are grateful subordinates in
evidence as well - clerical workers,
salespersons, assembly line workers
and children. This is a paradoxically
orderly revolution, promising simultaneously to change everything and to
support and maintain the order we
know best. It is depicted always as a
bloodless revolution in which no one
will get hurt, and everyone will get
more stuff.
The information revolution has
other distinct public meanings as well.
It is advertised as a crowning achievement of Yankee ingenuity applied to
the enterprise of science. (Japanese successes are often interpreted as an example of the effective transfer of Western
psychology.) Since large numbers are a
well understood sign of power in our
culture, impressive quantities are used
to describe the recent growth of information products and processes. This
year, for example, it is predicted that
the number of computers will outnumber all the people on the planet. The
number of people who effectively
direct "all those computers does not
seem to concern us as much.
Another sense of the information revolution is economic. It is defined as a
shift of capital and labor from extractive and manufacturing industries towards information products and services, with a corresponding shift in
GNP. The dimensions of this shift are
controversial, since our criteria for
classifying and defining information
products and services are evolving
ones. Its significance is also debatable,
since it is not clear whether this is a true
shift in the motor of economic growth
or the evasive action of an economy in
trouble. And finally, the assumption
that information has not always been a
salient feature of economic activity is a
modern conceit. Though economists

do not yet have useful conceptual and
mathematical tools for disaggregating
it historically, information has always
been a significant factor in economic
activity. To conclude that information
is economically emergent only in Our
own age is something like writing the
history of newspapers by asking when
they first began to resemble the New
York Times.

Finally, there is a social sense of the
information revolution, in which it is
held that power is shifting to those who
command new kinds of information.
This is the most problematic claim of
all, since there is no single social order
emerging from the information revolution, but a series of competing orders
filtered through ideal images for popular consumption. Three of the most
viable orders are those of family, work

The new information
revolution creates a
friendly consumption
community populated by
members of the
nostalgically reconstituted
family of the post-war
SUburbs

and time.
In the iconography of the information revolution, the family that buys a
home computer (much as earlier families purchased the World Book Encyclopedia) plays the role of the nuclear
family, a favorite national character.
The family shattered by the generation
gap, teleVision, divorce, automobiles,
fast food and property' taxes, the family once organized around familiar
arenas of consumption - a carport, a
home, a yard with a barbecue pit - the
family which is rarely ethnic or minority in custom or hue, has lately been reassembled around the home computer.
The video game removed from the
temptations of the video arcade to a

well-lighted domestic setting is the
hearth around which the nuclear family blossoms into an extended family of
little kids, big kids, parents, grandparents, uncles and aunts. The new information revolution creates a friendly
consumption community populated by
members of the nostalgically reconstituted family of the post-war suburbs.
A second narrative of order, this one
of work, depicts an executive whose radiant smile tells us he is not afraid of
the. personal computer proudly displayed on his paperless desk. This executive may have to learn to type, but on
the model of a pilot in control of a vast
cockpit, not a secretary churning out
endless assignments for others. ("Inside Every Investment Analyst Lives a
Daring Sub Commander," declares a
recent Radio Shack advertisement for
personal computers.) The white-collar
worker of popular convention rarely
moves real burdens against gravity or
through space. He or she manipulates
the magic levers of thought and influence. But. this executive surpasses all
white-collar competition shackled to
an earthbound realm of paper, which
may not be heavy to push but must be
physically sorted and tracked. With an
infinite electronic reach at his fingertips and the timeliest information from
the vastest data banks, he is lord of all
his computer surveys. He represents
the biggest target market for personal
computing, the largest growth segment
in the computer industry. His secretary, on the other hand, a clerical
worker along with 20 percent of all
American workers, may find her job
phased out completely if he can be persuaded to compose text directly into a
word processor instead of writing out
his rough drafts by hand or dictating
them.
Th.e information revolution is also
portrayed as the harbinger of an ideal
future, or temporal order. History, the
old order,. is no longer something to enrich and teach us, but something to be
sloughed off, a disorder that perfect
technologies can repair. Computing
will rob history of its power over us by
halting the tragic consequences of accumulated past errors. If the perfect
technology can be put to work in time,

we will stop history in its tracks. Such
beliefs rest on the conviction (a puzzling one, given the realities of everyday
experience) that the Industrial Revolution severed the inexorable chain of
fate, and that every subsequent technological development has been a further unraveling of historical necessity.
To the endless argument about
whether technology enhances the social
order, is at war with it, ought to replace it, or is simply its instrument, this
ideal temporal order answers that
social orders will come and go as long
as we are ruled by history. Technology,
in this view, is not a narrative of order,
but a clear and distinct reality with the
power to enter history from without.
This argument is made on two contradictory grounds. If history is an adver- '
sarial contest with nature, then by embodying our creative ingenuity, technology has the power to temper nature
and finally to conquer it. On the other
hand, if history is mainly a narrative of
man's inhumanity to man, then technology, which answers only to the impartial authority of nature, can transcend our quarrels and create a world of
plenty in which all conflict, having no
purpose, will vanish.
There is an unworkable paradox in
the presentation of technology both as
constrained by natural law alone and
entirely transparent to our wishes. Nor
is technology an autonomous agent of
change, as some current philosophical
fashions have it. It is never apart from
our history and our values, the things
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that define us as social beings. Like all
human creations, it is an expression of
social order and interest, inextricably
bound to circumstance and history.
_, Since order, interest, circumstance,
and history are also grounded in the
natural universe, technology participates in both the world of imagination
and the world of nature. It is above all
a special kind of power to make the
world of dreams real. Technologies are
embodied hopes, devices to implement
beliefs about how the world could be
made different. Technologies are social
dreams and fairy tales in action.
Our public fairy tales about computers are plentiful but shallow, perhaps
because they are very new. They tell us
the content of our wishes but do not
present the framework of wish-making
and the problems it presents. The vivid
plumage of current forms nevertheless
brings to mind one of the most instructive of traditional fairy tales, the tale of
three wishes. In return for giving aid to
a stranger who turns out to be an unrecognized divinity or, alternatively,
some concealed potential in ourselves,
an ordinary human soul, sometimes a
fisherman, receives a boon of three
wishes. The consequences of the wishes
always surprise the wisher and always
outstrip his efforts to negotiate an advantageous bargain with destiny. Outdone as often by his ignorance as by
vanity and greed, he often must use his
final wish to undo the unforeseen consequences of earlier ones.
One of the lessons of this tale is that
we can bargain with fewer aspects of
destiny than we think. We are never
completely in control of the future. We
never truly recognize the stranger in
front of us, and our best impulses may
precipitate great tragedies. Like the
fisherman's imagination, our imagination is always limited, never omniscient. But technology, our wish come
true, is not limited in its effects by our
imagination. It is not only technology,
among our creations, that has this
peculiar relationship to its creators.
Likewise our language, our art and our
children, carefully nurtured projections of our imagination all, also are
not fully under our control, which fact
is a source of constant wonder as well
September 1982/Illinois Issues/19

as chagrin. In many of our most hope- choice seems to be entirely ours to reful expectations for the information strict ourselves to good intentions
revolution are fishermen's wishes of while avoiding serious mistakes. The
this kind, fantasy solutions to difficult major flaw in this argument is not the
assumption that human nature is reliproblems incompletely considered.
Let us look at three of the most ably benevolent, but the assumption
widely held expectations for the com- that there is a breathing period in
which technology exists pure and unputer revolution:
1. The desire for options, for touched before human beings decide to
choices, for self-determination and de- use it for good or evil. There is also the
liverance from coercion, the wish for assumption, already noted, that the
freedom to choose our own destinies, is deleterious effects of any technology
represented in the notion that compu- can be foreseen and controlled, chosen
ting technology, like every other tech- or rejected at will.
nology, is neutral. It can only hurt us if
Technology is the imposition of an
we look it in the eye and give it our per- order on nature by human beings for
mission to do so. It can be put, with the the sake of some imagined useful pursame facility, to entirely constructive pose. Even if technology cannot actually violate nature's order (at least not
uses.
2. The desire for well-being, for the permanently), its human design is a set
guarantee of a safe and secure frame- of choices, at every level an expression
work within which to pursue the life we of value. All technology is humancherish, is represented in the notion made. If it's not human-made, it's not
that computers and computing skills technology; it's nature. Nor is nature
will diffuse automatically and demo- neutral to the human beings who live in
cratically. The natural seductiveness of it.. It is beautiful, awesome, soothing,
computing in combination with the difficult, helpful, dangerous by turns,
free market will nourish political and but it is never value free from the only
perspective available to us, our own. A
economic democracy.
3. Finally, the wish for pleasure, for modern adversarial view of nature is
what gives us human delight, is repre- responsible for the kinds of technology
sented in the notion that computers of- we have created to distance ourselves
fer novel possibilities for self-expres- from it. This nonneutral view of nature
sion and development; in particular, as a foe to be manipulated, rather than
that the vastly expanded storage capa- a powerful partner with whom to live
cities of computers offer inexhaustible in cooperation, has been responsible
resources for liberating the human for a scale and quality of technological
development about which serious quesspirit.
tions must be raised.
Every investment of social resources
TeChnological
in a particular technological order
changes the possibilities for realizing
neutrality
alternative social and technological
Perhaps the most optimistic of these orders. This can be said more bluntly.
is the wish that technology should be Every attempt to serve the interests of
neutral, that it should not take sides in one group of people within the shelterthe human enterprise to the advantage ing framework of a particular technoof some and not others, or worse, take logical arrangement limits and somesides against humanity collectively. times excludes possibilities for serving
Since technology may be used for good the interests of other people, or for
or evil, and since it has been used for serving different interests of the same
both, the neutralists believe their case people. This selection process has speis proved. In the information revolu- cific consequences for real human betion we are continuously verging on, a ings whose future choices (and whose
state which defers all consequential de- children's choices) will be constrained
cisions to the future and makes no one by decisions made with or without full
responsible for anything so far, the appreciation of the chain of effects
20/september 1982/Illinois Issues

that will follow from them.
Some proponents of the neutrality
argument claim, for example, that even
the bomb, that ominous symbol of our
age, is "neutral." Not until the button
is pushed will the bomb have consequences that are, in the tradition of the
three wishes, truly 'unimaginable. But
the logic of consequence cannot be suspended until this final terrible moment.
The consequences of the bomb are not
simply a latent potential as energy is latent in a stone. Every decision to research, develop, produce and maintain
bombs requires accompanying decisions not to do other things. The very
lowest level commitment of material to
bomb building, instead of, say, to the
manufacture of efficient cooking and
heating stoves contributes to a particular configuration of society and of the
world itself. These are morally complex and intricate configurations, but
they are not morally neutral and do not
randomly cancel one another out.
A student with whom I was discussing this point once asked whether
there couldn't be some perfectly neutral example of technology - whether,
for example, a hammer locked away in
a drawer and used by no one couldn't
be considered neutral. I don't think so.
A hammer represents a particular commitment of natural and social resources to its pJoduction and distribution among those who are thought to
be entitled to it. Hammers locked in
drawers also imply houses, which imply additional orders of social wealth
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Technology is the
imposition of an order on
nature by human beings
for the sake of some
imagined useful purpose

and organization, relationships of people to nature itself, and so forth. They
imply, further, a society whose members are able to buy tools which they do
not earn their living wielding, who buy
many things they do not need every
day. All these facts have a vast and specific social significance which can be
explored only with reference to concrete human lives and situations, but
which cannot be insignificant or neutral. If a hammer is not as emotionally
compelling as a bomb, it is no less embedded in and reflective of the society
that makes it, even as it lies inert in a
drawer much as a bomb lies in a silo.
In discussions of computers, the
wish for technological neutrality appears in the commandment against
anthropomorphizing them. Since computers are machines with no conscious
intentions of any kind towards human
beings in the way that we understand
the term "conscious," the habit of
treating them as though there were little men or women inside them responsible for th.e frustrations or rewards
L:tey bring us i~ regarded as evidence of
fuzzy thinking and inappropriate psychological projection. To harbor such
attitudes in a technological age is to be
embarrassingly ignorant of the score.
It is true enough that a computer is
not a person, But the plain facts are
that there isa little man sitting inside,
usually several little men, and more little women all the time. The myth of
neutrality prevents us from understanding our experience of technology

in precisely human terms. In point of
fact, most of us will never transact
directly with computing machines,
whether those machines are "userfriendly" minicomputers or numbercrunching mainframes. Only a few
highly trained engineers and computer
system architects will ever concern
themselves with the computer as brute
assemblage of chips and circuits. The
rest of us must approach the computer
as a logic system with many levels
and rules for creating, manipulating
and extending meaning. For most
users, successful computing is mastering some range of programs and programming languages which are imaginative structures created by other human
beings.
What it means to say that every computer contains a homunculus is that
every computer program, system or
language represents. other human beings with whom we are directly or indirectly engaged in symbolic transactions
of mutual responsbility. In the end, a
computer program is nothing more
than a new-fangled, highly mediated
conversation among people in which
each participant has his or her own
part to play. If there is any error of
mystification, it is in imagining that
ordinary people are not entitled to raise
questions about computer operation
and accountability, since computers
are merely machines. When the computer goes down at the bank, and you
are left standing in line with the excuse
that "the computer ... " followed by
various disclaimers of involvement on
the part of bank personnel, the neutrality myth has been hoisted. A program
shot through with errors and inflexibility, a program that does not take account of real situations in which real
people will use it (the program at the
bank that does not anticipate peak demand loads, for example), is a human
creation and a human responsibility, as
is the program that helps you do what
you want quickly and efficiently.
The commandment not to anthropomorphize computers, to respect their
mythical neutrality, transfers responsibility from those who construct poor
programs and systems to nonexpert
users who are encouraged to blame

their own ignorance and anxiety for
any unfortunate machine-man encounters, since the least knowledgeable and
experienced users are most easily intimidated into believing they are not smart
or quick enough to play in the front
yard of technological culture. Those
who are the most sophisticated in the
use of this symbol system have the
greatest responsibility to develop and
share its potential benefits in a way
that includes as many people as possible.

Safety and security
The same technology that is defended on some occasions as unimpeachably neutral is trotted out on
others as the future foundation and
chief guarantor of a Way of Life. We
believe not only that utopia is available
to everyone with the right equipment,
but also that the information-age descendants of the Industrial Revolution
will salvage the disappointed goals of
the Enlightenment. The second fisherman's wish is the hope that computing
technology contains, by nature, a
democratic logic of development. Once
(according to the rhetoric of the information revolution) computer hardware
has diffused rapidly, widely and cheaply, then as effect follows cause in a fortunate chain of necessary events, the
acquisition of computer skills by the
population at large will follow painlessly. Since those who can most successfully manipulate the symbol systems of their age are best fitted to govern themselves reflectively and self-critically, widespread computer literacy
will strengthen and enlarge the democratic character of daily experience.
The present order will prevail.
Although computers are flexible
enough to employ any symbol system
programmed into them, including
Egyptian hieroglyphics, alphanumeric
symbols are the basis of common discourse among most computer users,
and alphanumeric literacy is therefore
the single essential prerequisite for
computing skill. It is both a curious
and true fact that alphanumeric literacy has never in all of history spread to
any large group of people automaticalSeptember 1982/Illinois Issues/21

ly. The effective diffusion of written with the levels of computing to which
literacy to new groups of any size has people are likely to have access. Access
always required a very large effort by to the most powerful computers is
some authority with both extensive re- available to Big Business, Big Governsources and large powers of compul- ment and Big Education. Access to
computers for job-related tasks execsion - the state or the church.
In England, for example, the intro- uted by limited programs with little induction of writing as a routine admin- tellectual flexibility or power are availistrative instrument of government able to a wide range of workers from
took two entire centuries, from the airline reservationists to inventory con11th to the 13th. Because of a series of trol clerks. Video games are available
state initiatives that made written in- to poor people. Which child, the child
struments mandatory for all legal prop- of the janitor or the child of the faculty
erty claims in place of customary, age- member, will be more likely to acquire
old oral instruments, literacy was grad- access to the computer of the university
ually extended from the king's court for which both their parents work?
Personal computers are certainly less
down to the level of municipal authority. But from the 13th until practically expensive than large mainframes or
the 19th century, further increases in sophisticated microprocessors, but are
literacy were relatively modest; and hardly within everyone's price range.
most citizens remained nonliterate The newest model Apple II personal
despite the invention in the 15th cen- computer fitted out with a modest but'
tury of a new and powerful information technology, the printing press.
Not until the advent of 19th-century
compulsory education, representing
state leverage on a grand scale, did A qUarter will buy a video
mass alphanumeric literacy become a
game, but video skills are
reality.
Even in the 20th century, mass liter- not the basis of powerful ~
acy is pursued rather than achieved.
Several years ago a University of Texas computer skills any more
study suggested that perhaps 20 per- than potato chips are the
cent of American adults are not functionally literate. If we cannot create basis of good nutrition
mass literacy by seduction in a world
where the value and purpose of books
are well understood, a world where literacy skills are familiar social furniture, the belief that the natural fascina- functional amount of software comes
tion of computing will be an adequate for around $1,500 and is not within the
social stimulus to mass computer liter- reach of poor families and many notso-poor families in this country,
acy is fantasy.
The diffusion of computers and though a national newsmagazine recomputing skills depends on something cently spoke reassuringly of new generbesides desire, something that is ations of home computers priced at
neither democratically or automati- under $1,000, "bringing them within
cally distributed - and that is money. reach of schools, parents, or the chilA quarter will buy a video game, but dren themselves" ("Here Come the
video skills are not the basis of power- Microkids," Time, May 3, 1982, p.
ful computer skills any more than po- 51). This estimation of a ceiling of actato chips are the basis of good nutri- cessibility suggests a notion of the retion.Put another way, video games are sources and opportunities of most chilto computer literacy as being able to dren that makes the breath come hard.
sign "X" in lieu of one's signature is to This is not democracy. This is a way to
the power of real alphanumeric literacy. widen information gaps and keep peoThere is a distinct class bias associated ple out of the information chain. The
22/Sliptember 1982/Illinois Issues

same economic and historical factors
that make some persons more likely to
receive excellent training in alphanumeric literacy, and others less likely to,
are exaggerated when it comes to computer literacy. Skilled teachers of computer literacy are far rarer than skilled
teachers of print literacy, and computer systems of any power cost far more
than books full of powerful ideas. The
largest national manufacturer of personal computers, Apple Inc., recently
announced its intention to donate a
tax-deductible minicomputer to every
school in the United States. While the
spirit of this plan may be laudable,
logistically speaking, it is only somewhat more visionary than giving every
school a single pencil for teaching written literacy.
The consequences of electronically
created information gaps and monopolies are more serious still when we
extend our concern to a world community. If it will be difficult to propel
many of our own citizens into the computing mainstream, what can we say
for the information age prospects of
poor countries with large nonliterate
populations? The computer information and communications networks
which successfully serve industrialized
economies pose terrifically difficult obstacles for countries already struggling
to live with our technological precociousness. Nations knit by traditional
oral systems of communication seem
backward only in a world that measures power by the speed with which
information moves and the extent of its
reach. The political, economic and social disequilibrium in which these
countries are placed by their simultaneous desires to compete with high-technology societies and to serve the basic
needs of their populations is nevertheless real. Since the introduction of
most technology is lumpy, it could be
argued that eventually this balance will
be redressed. What history suggests is
that the balance will not be redressed
automatically, as our fisherman's wish
has it, and that for some groups redress
will come too late or not at all.
For it remains to be proved that
technological advance raises everyone's standard of living S00ner or

later. The social and economic cost to Europe) that the Indians lacked appropoot countries of Western technologi- priate written proofs of ownership. On
cal development since the Industrial occasion Europeans, and later their
Revolution has never been seriously American descendants, took steps to
calculated. Over several centuries we perpetuate the illiteracy of slave popuhave significantly raised the standard lations. New information technologies
of living in the West, but the long-term have always challenged old hierarchies
effect on other parts of the world and of privileged and popular knowledge,
our own future is not so clear. A num- but they have also introduced new and
ber of cultures have been destroyed or unequal hierarchies of privileged and
irreparably damaged by our technolo- popular knowledge as well.
gical development. Others have shoulOne telling example comes from the
dered massive economic dependencies. history of telegraphy, the very first of
Today, for example, large numbers the electric information technologies of
. of young Asian women work in high which computing is the latest example.
health-risk conditions at very low To many observers in the mid-19th
wages to assemble the integrated chips century, the telegraph seemed quite as
and circuits for which the West is so revolutionary as the computer seems to
eager. For pocket change and the tin- us. Jacksonian democrats of this perfoil excitement of a few years of urban iod hailed it as a technology with a
living, some of them are jeopardizing built-in logic decentralization and extheir eyesight, and others are jeopardi- pected it to put an end to monopolies
zing what social status they may have of information that distorted political
had in the traditional societies from and economic democracy. Information
which they come. They cannot easily that could traverse continental disreturn to the old society, where "factory girls" are often unmarriageable,
their tenure in their present jobs is
short, and their health may make them
unemployable in other jobs. It is hard
to believe that the diffusion of "progress" will compensate for the personal and cultural pain this work will mean
for many of them. In this case, the burden of change falls heavily on the most
defenseless.
The conventional belief that the invention of new modes and skills of
communication is an unmixed blessing
for the world finds little historical support. In this respect not even literacy tances instantly seemed less vulnerable
has a thoroughly honorable history. In to manipulation by the industrial East
the half a millennium since the inven- against the hinterlands.
Ironically, the telegraph for which so
tion of printing, both printing and literacy have been used against cultures much had been hoped became somewithout these tools. With the indispen- thing quite unexpected: the first nasable assistance of maps and written tionwide industrial monopoly in the
orders, for example, large military and United States ..
expeditionary forces were deployed
In a frequently repeated pattern,
from the Old World to the New by some early telegraph companies joined
Europeap invaders, and global trade with regional railroad monopolies in
was more easily organized to the strate- arrangements that made them the exgic advantage of the West. Europeans clusive carriers of all telegraph mesdenied Indian claims to their own na- sages received and transmitted by the
tive lands with the specious legal ra- contracting railroads. In return, these
tionale (credible only perhaps to the railroads were accorded preferential
nouveaux literati cultures of Western telegraph rates and treatment. In the

bitter competition of this period
among scores of small telegraph companies, those with railroad alliances
fared best and often merged into regional telegraph monopolies. Not long
after the Civil War these regional systems had coalesced into virtually a single monopoly system of commercial
telegraphy under Western Union. Before the end of the century most newswire traffic also belonged to a single
company, the New York Associated
Press, which also had exclusive Western Union contracts. The first electric
information technology erected new
forms of centralization and monopoly,
and became a prototype for modern
big business.

Computing
for pleasure
The last of our fisherman's wishes is
that computers should offer new opportunities for creative pleasure.
Though we seem to wish for more play
in our lives, play has no ritually
honored or justified place in our society. It is what can begin only after all
the work is done. And the work is
never done. When new information
technologies shorten the time or
decrease the capacity needed to accomplish a given task, we increase the
number of tasks for which we are
responsible and extend the range of
their operation, so that additional time
and space that might have been given
to playful expression is once again
dedicated to productive necessity.
The more communications capacity
we create, the more opportunity for
purely imaginative communication
there could be. The rhetoric of productivity that dominates our lives subordinates all play to the major task of
managing the world's more and more
tightly wound economic machinery, instead of as a social function of the
greatest importance. Play explores
what is unexpected and surprising. It
lays the groundwork for noncoercive
social and personal change. Certainly
play has a ritualistic and socially conservative character as well. But genuine
playfulness stretches imagination by
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releasing it from bondage to one task.
By encouraging the shock and delight
of the unanticipated, it promotes
transformation. Its dynamic agent is
not social compulsion, but the fascination of previously undiscovered possibilities. Play is a genuinely constructive instrument of social change.
The more constrained and specialized
our social roles, the more important is
the existence of a playful experimental
margin within which more fragile and
tentative aspects of personal and social
development can flourish. Play can
also offer us imaginative worlds to
cultivate that do not require the production and consumption of more and
more goods for their maintenance. In a
world of dangerously diminishing resources, the cultivation of creative
playfulness as an alternative to the insatiable overconsumption of so many
industrialized societies may be crucial.

New technologies
create conditions for
new power struggles;
they are the manifest
imperfection as well as the
marvel of our morality
and imagination . ..

With the emergence of new information technologies of greatly increased
capacity and interactivity, scarcities of
the means and resources for communicating are sometimes described as
a thing of the past. The notion that
new technologies will absorb the
overflow of utilitarian message-making
and offer a wealth of extra channels
for imaginative play and development
is'not a new one. All the civilizations to
which writing and printing came
learned to swallow the increased
volume of messages those technologies
made possible and to demand more.
The scarcity of channels with which to
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communicate has always depended
more on social, political and economic
priorities, arrangements governed by
human values all, than on simple
technological virtuosity.
Technologies like computing do not,
no matter how much we wish them to,
release us from the eternal human
obligation to make responsible value
choices. Something more than apparatus will always be required to free us
from the shortcomings of our own
morality and imagination. New technologies create conditions for new
power struggles, they are the manifest
imperfection as well as the marvel of
our morality and imagination, they use
scarce resources which are then unavailable for other purposes. And this
will always be so.
Many of the most disturbing consequences of the information revolution
are taking place out of the spotlight
where it is hard for us to see them, in
the margins of our own and other
societies, among the poor, among
Third World populations, among
women and the elderly, in the environment itself, among many groups whose
connection to centers of power is very
tenuous. Because it is always difficult
to see effects at the margins, it is even
more difficult to understand the connections from these effects to the
choices for which we are answerable.
Many people can be damaged before
those with the power and the concern
to change such conditions, certainly all
of us with a generous share of the
creature comforts of our age, take
notice. Technology, information technology especially, should not give us
the power not to notice that others are
in trouble.
New information technologies will
be used by the powerful to increase
their power unless somebody makes
other plans. And just as freedom,
security and pleasure have never been
easily won in the history of the world,
just as that battle is never fully won
and must be continually refought, so it
is not going to be easy now. But it is
going to be important. 0
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